Lawyers, malware, and money: The antivirus market’s nasty fight over Cylance


Image source: https://arstechnica.com/

Last November, a systems engineer at a large company was evaluating security software products when he discovered something suspicious.

One of the vendors had provided a set of malware samples to test—48 files in an archive stored in the vendor’s Box cloud storage account. The vendor providing those samples was Cylance, the information security company behind Protect, a “next generation” endpoint protection system built on machine learning. In testing, Protect identified all 48 of the samples as malicious, while competing products flagged most but not all of them. Curious, the engineer took a closer look at the files in question—and found that seven weren’t malware at all.

That led the engineer to believe Cylance was using the test to close the sale by providing files that other products wouldn’t detect—that is, bogus malware only Protect would catch.

Protect has been highly ranked by a number of industry analysts for its innovative approach to “advanced endpoint security,” the broad term used to describe products designed to stop modern malware and other threats to personal computers. Protect bases its detection and blocking of malware on machine learning technology. Rather than use heuristics that look for behaviors matching specific rules, Protect has been “trained” using “the DNA markers of 1 billion known bad and 1 billion known good files,” said Cylance’s vice president of product testing and industry relations, Chad Skipper. The company’s idea has drawn investors; in fact, the stakes in Cylance taken by venture capital firms thus far value the company at $1 billion.

One reason Cylance and other new malware protection contenders have drawn so much investment—over $1.8 billion in venture capital since 2014—is that the malware protection industry is ripe for disruption.

“I’ve always been of the opinion that the antivirus industry is a little weird compared to the rest of infosec,” said Carl Gottlieb, CTO of the UK-based security consulting firm Cognition. “It’s the one industry where if you talk to any end user, they pretty much hate the product they buy every year.”

But over the past year, competitors and testing companies have accused Cylance of using product tests that favor the company. These critics have also accused Cylance of using legal threats to block independent, competitive testing.

“Even if [Cylance products] score well in our tests,” said Peter Stelzhammer, co-founder of the testing organization AV-Comparatives, “they ‘trust’ only their own sponsored test, where they can dictate the methodology.”

Cylance executives, in turn, have accused some testing companies of running tests that inaccurately represent performance—or of outright “fraud,” as one Cylance exec has repeatedly asserted in blog posts and interviews.

In an interview with Ars, Cylance’s Skipper said that current malware testing was out of step with the real threats. “There are testing organizations that do see the need to change and are working to adapt their testing methodologies,” he said. “But there are others who are frankly pay-to-play and will do anything the vendor wants them to do when it comes to the testing. We’ve seen our software pirated, put in with an older version on purpose, a lack of updates, and those sorts of things.”

So Cylance has run a series of its own shootout events to prove the superiority of Protect—tests that at least one competitor has called out as being “unfair.”

Such concerns around anti-malware testing extend far beyond Cylance and have existed for years.

“Sometimes you see weird things,” remarked Luis Corrons, the chief technology officer of Panda Security, speaking broadly about the industry. “There are many ways to poison a test or try to influence it.”

Corrons and Righard Zwienenberg of ESET presented a paper at the Virus Bulletin Conference in October 2016 on the potential gaming anti-malware product tests. In it, they noted a few obvious examples. “Some testers organize their malware testbeds by naming the files by their hashes,” the two wrote. “There have been cases where products were not able to detect malware in a file with a ‘normal’ filename, while it was detected when the name of the file matched the file’s hash.”

In short, this is an industry where it can be hard to know the “objective truth”—or if such a thing even exists.

Packing it in

The case against Cylance turns on the practice of “re-packing” existing malware samples—essentially turning them into “fresh” malware. Rather than passing prospective customers raw malware samples to test, Cylance first alters the files using software utilities commonly referred to as “packers.” Packers convert executable files into self-extracting archives or otherwise obscure their executable code.

Packers have been used by some software developers (and malware authors) for over a decade to reduce the files needed for an application down to one, to control software licensing, or to defeat reverse-engineering or signature-based detection by changing the checksum value (“hash”) of the file in question—which may allow malware to slip past signature-based file checks.

Cylance executives said that they have used packing utilities to create “mutated” malware for testing, including some of the samples used in the company’s “Unbelievable” demos. “We do exactly what the enemy does,” said Skipper. “They share malware and repackage that malware to evade signature-based detection.”

Skipper contrasted this with how other vendors test products, claiming that the repositories of malware samples competitors rely on—such as the Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization (AMTSO) and its Real Time Threat List (RTTL)—are fundamentally compromised.

“If you just go and you pull down malware from any of the well known virus repository sites,” Skipper said, “anyone who has a relationship with those sites is going to score a 100 on the test” as a byproduct of already having access to all the malware samples. “So that’s not really an effective test, and it’s also not representative of the malware that’s going to hit or target a human organization. When it hits, no one is ever going to have seen it before. So that’s more representative of what’s happening today.”

The AMTSO says RTTL samples are contributed by both vendors and independent researchers. It’s true that some testers use the RTTL, which gets its samples from both malware protection vendors and security researchers, and also tracks the regional prevalence of samples. But some of the leading test organizations don’t use RTTL; both NSS Labs CEO Vikram Phatak and MRG-Effitas CEO Chris Pickard told Ars that they collect their own samples live from the Internet and don’t share them with vendors until after tests are completed. And there’s no shortage of fresh malware out there for others to capture.

In addition to distributing its own malware samples through its “Test it Yourself” website, Cylance has pointed customers to a website called TestMyAV—a source for malware samples and testing methodologies for small and medium businesses to use to evaluate endpoint security products. TestMyAV, which got a shout-out from Cylance Chief Research Officer Jon Miller in a January “Ask Me Anything” session, is operated by Carl Gottlieb of Cognition—that Cylance reseller we mentioned earlier.

Gottlieb said TestMyAv has no connection to Cylance or to his reseller business. “The two don’t mix…we just let TMA whir away in the background servicing those that access it,” he said. However, TestMyAV also uses packing tools to repackage malware samples.

Skipper’s explanation behind malware repacking—that existing collections just aren’t fresh enough to be accurate—doesn’t get much support from some others in the industry. “Sure, you can create malware,” said Luis Corron of Panda Security. “But what for? Why? There are like 300,000 new malware samples every day. If there was some sort of shortage—’malware is so hard to find, no one is getting infected’—okay, fine, but these days the difficult thing is not getting infected with new malware.”

There are some obvious problems with using repacked malware for testing. Because of the prevalence of packers in the malware world, signature detection is generally not used as a primary line of defense by endpoint protection products. In fact, some products (including F-Secure) heuristically flag packed files by default because packers like MPRESS and VMprotect have been so closely associated with malware.

Gottlieb acknowledged that, saying that he doesn’t use MPRESS (an open-source packing utility), because “Symantec is very good at catching it.”

It turns out Protect is also really, really good at flagging files processed with some packers. “The reality is that yes, [Cylance is] very good at detecting packers,” acknowledged Gottlieb. But, he added, that’s not a bad thing, especially if packed files have been heavily modified—or even if they’re benign. “If something has been modified to look like a virus, I’d probably want to know,” he said. “I guess it depends on how you look at the world.”

Which brings us back to the samples Cylance provided to that prospective customer in November. The files that only Cylance caught in the test were all repacked in some way; five of the files were processed with MPRESS and the remainder were packed with other tools, including what appears to be a custom packer.

Of the nine files in question, testing by the customer, by Ars, and by other independent researchers showed that only two actually contained malware. One of the MPRESS-packed samples appeared to contain a copy of the MPRESS packer itself. The remainder of the MPRESS files contained either “husks”—essentially empty files—or samples that had been corrupted in packing. Two others crashed on execution, after opening a bunch of Windows resources without using them.

When asked about these files, Skipper said, “We don’t give empty files on purpose—it’s just not what we do.” Cylance contends the non-malware files were included because of an error by a company engineer. (The customer conducting the test in question was unconvinced.)

As for why empty packed files would be caught, Cylance’s Vice President of Product Marketing Bryan Gale explained that Protect’s machine learning algorithms might identify packed executables as malicious based on what it “learned” about malicious behavior from the training files.

Gale said Cylance Protect will “convict” things as malicious based on their behavior—such as loading junk or empty files into memory—because that might “actually [be] causing harm or introducing a vulnerability on the system.” But, Gale insisted, “We’re typically not going to go in and blindly block something if it’s packed with MPRESS or another packer.”

In a December blog post, however, the chief technology officer of MRG-Effitas, Zoltan Balazs, said that he found specific references to the packing tools MPRESS and VMprotect inside a malware protection product while he was viewing its executable code in a hex editor.

“We have no idea what this code does, but it is an interesting coincidence to find these strings in the code of the product, ” Balazs wrote.”There can be multiple reasons why all packed files are detected as malicious. Either because all packed files are malicious, or because the vendor believes in high false positive ratio in order to have higher true positive detection. Which is fine. But during the demos… every VMProtect packed file will be detected by [Cylance].”

For its part, Cylance denied the screenshot actually showed Protect’s code. “It’s a hex view of a sample packed with MPRESS and VMprotect, it looks like,” a Cylance spokesperson said in response to that allegation. “It’s a sample from TestMyAV, I believe. It’s malware, not Cylance.”

However, Balazs insists the code is from Cylance’s product. “Yes, it was Cylance Protect,” he told Ars, “but we did not reverse engineer their software, we just looked at strings in the binaries.”

An analysis by Ars of other MPRESS- and VMprotect-packed files found no internal references to either piece of software. (Additionally, Gottlieb had already mentioned he doesn’t use MPRESS for files on TestMyAV.)

Bad blood

Cylance has created waves with its (ongoing) “Unbelievable Tour” roadshow, an ongoing series of events at which it demonstrates Protect against other products using “100 of the latest virus samples and 100 mutated virus samples,” according to Cylance. But some competitors have called the Unbelievable Tour tests unfair at best.

Last June, Dan Schiappa, a Senior Vice President and General Manager at the security software firm Sophos, called Cylance out for allegedly questionable practices when he wrote about the experience of a Sophos customer at one of these events in Las Vegas last year:

[O]ne Sophos customer (from Chicago) in the audience asked to see how the Sophos product was configured for Cylance’s “Unbelievable” demo. On reviewing the settings, the customer discovered that key (and default) protection settings had been disabled. When the customer insisted that Cylance enable the proper default configuration and re-run the test, Sophos beat Cylance. The same behavior has been reported by multiple other vendors, including the disabling of everything other than hash lookups–an unfair test, to say the least.

Sophos obtained a copy of Cylance Protect from a reseller in order to conduct its own test, then posted the results in a YouTube video. Cylance then “contacted the reseller who provided access to the Cylance PROTECT product, citing license compliance concerns and threatening ‘retribution’ if the reseller involved did not demand that Sophos withdraw the video immediately,” Schiappa wrote. “This left the reseller in fear of a lawsuit.” Sophos pulled the video to protect the reseller. But, Schiappa claims, Cylance has continued to do public demos using Sophos products in violation of their licensing terms—and after renewing the license through a Sophos reseller. Cylance says that the company has since stopped using Sophos’ software in its “Unbelievable” demos. And Gale rejected Schiappa’s assertion that the demos were unfair.

“During our demos,” Gale said, “we fully enable all protection features of every single product as well as provide full network connectivity to each competing product to allow for their cloud lookups.  We try to provide complete transparency in our demos. At multiple trade shows and Unbelievable Tour stops, members of the audience have questioned whether we fully enable the competitor’s protection.  In those instances, we allowed those people to personally inspect the competitive product settings.”

Gale added that Sophos’ pulled video blog was in itself misleading:

“Sophos ran samples from 100 executables.  Despite using these older samples, our machine learning software still detected and would have blocked this malware if our settings had been properly configured. We know for a fact that they did not have our script controls turned on when demonstrating malicious PDFs, Word docs and script-based malware.  When demonstrating malicious URLs or phishing attacks they never actually executed the malware.  The way our product works is by controlling execution…dormant malware will not be touched unless they specifically turn on our background scanning setting.  They specifically had our memory defense features turned to alert only when demonstrating exploits evading us.  When in Alert Only mode, we will alert, but obviously not block the malicious exploit attempt.”

Schiappa’s allegations are similar to the experience recounted by some third-party testing organizations that have made Cylance unhappy. While AV-Comparatives and MRG-Effitas were performing a series of joint tests comparing Cylance Protect to other products, Cylance moved to revoke their license, claiming it was purchased under false pretenses.

Cylance is “really playing dirty,” said Stelzhammer. “In fact, Cylance is now trying to revoke all licenses we bought.” Stelzhammer and Pickard said that they purchased the licenses through Malware Managed, a Cylance partner that offers the product as a managed service.

Cylance’s Skipper  told CSO’s Steve Ragan in February, “We have no records or invoices showing that MRG Effitas, AV-Comparatives, or any person associated with these companies purchasing CylancePROTECT.” And a  Cylance spokesperson re-affirmed this to Ars, stating that the licenses were cancelled because they were obtained fraudulently:

Neither Cylance nor Malware Managed has any records or invoices showing that the company AV-Comparatives purchased CylancePROTECT. AV-Comparatives was able to acquire a copy by having an employee purchase a copy using an unrelated email account. Once it was determined that AV-Comparatives had not lawfully licensed the product, the license was terminated pursuant to the terms of the license agreement and a refund was given.

This action was not taken lightly as there was evidence in two previous tests conducted by AV-Comparatives where they misconfigured and used an old version of CylancePROTECT to skew the results.

In his discussion with Ars, Skipper expanded on that assertion. “They were using an older version of Cylance—by 3 months—and the up-to-date versions of Sophos, ESET, and Symantec,” Skipper said. “So that’s just plain not fair.”

Stelzhammer and Pickard insist that they were using the software in its latest updated form through the managed service.

Getting “real-world”

Cylance’s contention that many third-party tests are inaccurate is not without merit. Nearly everyone Ars spoke with agreed that many anti-malware tests were flawed, though they would not mention any by name. And everyone we spoke to—testers included—agreed that the best tests make an effort to reproduce “real-world” conditions.

The problem is that few can agree on what “real-world conditions” actually mean—and vendors support definitions that play to their strengths. Independent tests, as a result, often run into flack from vendors. For example, in NSS Labs’ latest advanced endpoint protection test, Cylance’s Skipper complained about the presence of certain files.

“They said we missed a certain number of pieces of malware,” he said, “and we took [the files] back and found they really weren’t malware. The stuff that they were saying was malware was really what we call a PUA [potentially unwanted application]. One was literally a Japanese Web browser, and there was a scientific calculator that was being installed.”

But NSS’s Phatak said those files were just part of trying to make the test more like the real-world experience. NSS mixed legitimate downloads with “attack” traffic in some parts of its test, in an effort to truly measure detection rates by keeping vendors from simply blocking everything. “We were intentionally mixing things up so people couldn’t play games,” said Phatak. “We knew it would be tough to test these guys in that they would be unhappy. We’ve been testing for a long time. But we were surprised at the extent to which people were not used to not being able to set the rules.”

One vendor, CrowdStrike, even pulled out of the NSS Labs tests and revoked the testers’ license, then attempted to obtain a restraining order to block publication of the results NSS had obtained. “CrowdStrike filed suit in US Federal District Court against NSS Labs to hold it accountable for unlawfully accessing our software, breaching our contract, pirating our software, and improper security testing,” a company spokesperson wrote in a post to CrowdStrike’s blog. “Regardless of test results (which we have not seen), CrowdStrike is making a stand against what we believe to be unlawful conduct.” The court denied CrowdStrike’s initial request for a restraining order, but the case has yet to be decided.

“This whole CrowdStrike thing has been an interesting experience,” NSS’s Phatak told Ars. “I’ve never seen a vendor go to such lengths to keep someone from testing independently.”

Another industry problem is that independently testing antivirus protection in something approaching a real-world environment is extremely expensive. Most of the independent testing organizations depend on the malware protection industry for their funding, though some (such as AV-Comparatives) are partially underwritten by government and nonprofit institutions. NSS Labs’ tests ares fully funded by subscribers—but the price of those subscriptions (and even one-off report purchases) are well out of range of smaller organizations. So the only versions of “real world” that most customers get are the ones vendors decide suit them.

Cylance recently paid AV-TEST to run a test designed to Cylance’s specifications—something that Skipper called “Real-world AV testing with integrity.” For one part of the test, AV-TEST “created 15 pieces of their own malware, all of their own, and tested against us and five other vendors,” Skipper said. (The other five “leading” competitors were not named in the results.)

Maik Morgenstern, Chief Technology Officer of AV-TEST, said that these were not really malware per se but “simulated attacks” that attempted to do things that malware would do. “These are executables that will perform malicious actions on the system, such as encrypting files or exfiltrating data,” Morgenstern explained. AV-TEST plans on using the simulated attacks in future tests.

The other parts of the Cylance test, however, used two methodologies that Morgentsterm said AV-TEST would not use going forward. These methodologies, incidentally, are also included in the recommendations made by Gottlieb’s TestMyAV (recommendations Gottlieb said are still being added to).

In what Skipper called “the holiday test,” the products’ live updating was disabled. “We waited five days,” said Skipper, “didn’t allow them to get online, and introduced malware into them to determine whether they would detect the new malware.” In the third part of the test, the URL filtering capabilities of products were turned off to prevent the use of cloud-based reputation screening of sites. “We then did hundreds of ‘drive-bys’,” Skipper explained—visiting malicious sites that attempt to download malware.

Skipper’s justification for disabling updates and URL filtering—two features that Protect doesn’t use—is that “an organization is never 100 percent up-to-date. We’ve seen end users stop the updates, and we’ve seen them turn off URL filtering.”

The tests may have made Cylance happy; unsurprisingly, Protect did very well against the other products. But the the Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization—a non-profit industry organization—has officially denounced the “holiday test” and unfiltered Web methodologies , stating: “We reject turning off product capabilities while comparing the capabilities of products in real-world use, as we believe that this introduces bias in the results.”

In order for there to be some trustworthiness behind test results, AMTSO has been trying to corral the industry toward a set of testing standards for a decade. But as evidence of how contentious the issue is, AMTSO’s first draft standard for testing was only published last September.

Gottlieb, who joined AMTSO when he launched TestMyAV, is not optimistic about things progressing any faster. “Honestly, I think we’re further away from a benchmark than ever before,” he said. “Efficacy varies far too much for vendors to want to agree to a single benchmark.”

Heisenberg’s principle

Gottleib and Cylance certainly make valid points about the problems with how testing is currently done. And there are possible alternative explanations for each allegation about Cylance’s product testing: An engineer could have made a mistake in repacking a folder full of samples. Protect may have detected the files because the AI behind it determined packers to be malicious. And without being able to look inside Protect’s code to understand the references Balasz found, it’s impossible to say for sure what’s going on.

Given the amount of uncertainty that comes with measuring how well any malware protection works, the entire controversy could end up being a rounding error. But the confusion and controversy in the industry are not exactly comforting when you’re trying to figure out how to best protect yourself from the next potential security breach or ransomware infection.

Original story at Ars Technica

Link: arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/the-mystery-of-the-malware-that-wasnt/